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Abstract 
 
The number of undergraduate-level textbooks on environmental economics has increased in 
recent years, but the textbook treatment of optimal emissions (abatement) varies markedly from 
textbook to textbook. In particular, there is no consensus as to whether to model the economic 
“bad” (i.e. emissions) or the economic “good” (abatement).  This inconsistency can lead to some 
needless confusion for students introduced to environmental economics for the first time, 
particularly those students outside of the formal economics major, such as students of business 
administration and public policy.  As a means of mitigating this confusion, I propose a simple 
example that instructors can use in lecture, test question, or student assignment format, that 
illustrates the duality between modeling emissions and abatement. 
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Introduction 
There has been a noticeable increase in the number of undergraduate-level textbooks on 
the subject of environmental economics in recent years. Most textbooks are structured in 
standard fashion starting with a review of efficient markets leading into a discussion of market 
failures; common property resources, externalities, and public goods, with emphasis placed on 
the latter two.  Shortly thereafter, most textbooks then launch into a discussion of either optimal 
emissions or optimal abatement levels with a corresponding discussion of the various policy 
designs that economists have developed over the years. 
The textbook treatment of optimal emissions (abatement) varies markedly from textbook 
to textbook, particularly for those texts aimed at the undergraduate level. In particular, there is no 
consensus as to whether to model the economic “bad” (i.e. emissions) or the economic “good” 
(abatement).  Field and Field (2009) tend to model emissions while Callan and Thomas (2010) 
model abatement.  Many textbooks, such as Tietenberg (2003), Kalstad (2011), Perman, Ma, 
McGilvray, and Common (2003), and Hanley, Shogren, and White (2007), will in some places 
model emissions and in other places model abatement (or pollution control). Perman, Ma, 
McGilvray, and Common (2003), for instance, will model emissions when discussing the welfare 
implications of an optimal emission tax and subsidy (p. 220) and model abatement when 
modeling tradable permit markets with firms facing different abatement cost functions (p. 226). 
This inconsistency in presentation does not suggest any serious or inherent flaw in any of 
these textbooks. After all, minimizing the social harm caused by emissions is the economic dual 
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of maximizing the net social benefits derived from abatement.
2
  It is true that the relative merits 
of each approach, i.e. modeling the economic “good” or the economic “bad”, can be debated.3 
However, this inconsistency between and within textbooks can lead to some needless confusion 
for those students being introduced to environmental economics.  As a means of mitigating this 
confusion, I propose below a simple example that instructors can use, either in lecture, as a test 
question, or as a student assignment, that illustrates the duality. This note, then, follows in the 
tradition of some recent literature, such as Corrigan (2011), Main (2010), Kahane (2002), Heyes 
(2000), and Yates (1998) that offer instructors of environmental economics courses illustrative 
examples and in-class experiments to improve delivery of course topics.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, I present a 
model illustrating the duality between the optimal abatement level and optimal emissions level. 
The model is kept deliberately simple and straightforward so as to be accessible to the often 
broad audience of students studying environmental economics: upper-level undergraduate and 
beginning graduate students of economics, students studying business administration, students 
studying law and public policy, etc.  After that, I review the basic welfare implications of the two 
different modeling approaches and offer a short conclusion.  
 
A Simple Example 
Modeling the Economic “Good”   
Consider a firm that emits as a by-product of production carbon dioxide (C02) thus 
degrading the air quality in a nearby neighborhood.  Carbon dioxide reductions are possible but 
only at a cost.  Let [0,1]a  be the percentage of carbon pollution created but abated at cost A(a). 
Let the cost function be defined as 2( ) 2A a a . This will generate a linear marginal abatement 
cost function commonly published in environmental economics textbooks and familiar to most 
students.  For context, allow costs (as well as the benefits defined below) to be measured in 
thousands of dollars. 
Assume that the per-person benefits of abatement increase with the percent of C02 abated 
but at a diminishing rate.  To reflect this, define the benefit function as 2( ) .5B a a a . Like the 
abatement cost function, this will generate a linear marginal benefit schedule common in most 
texts.  Notice also that 2 2/ 0, / 0dB da d B da , indicating that benefits increase with abatement 
but at a decreasing rate.  Further, assume that C02 abated can be treated as a pure public good 
(i.e. cleaner air is non-excludable and non-rival), so that total affected population benefits are 
simply ( )NB a , where N is the number of affected individuals. Let N = 12.  The social welfare 
(SW) maximization problem is thus: 
 
 max ( ) ( )
a
SW NB a A a . (1) 
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Incorporating our specific functional forms, we have: 
 
 2 2max 12( 0.5 ) 2
a
SW a a a . (2) 
 
The first order condition is where the marginal benefit of abatement (MB(a)) equals the marginal 
cost of abatement (MAC(a)). Mathematically, from (2), this condition is: 
 
 12(1 ) 4 ,a a  (3) 
 
where MB(a) = 12(1-a) and MAC(a) = 4a.  Note that ( ) / 0dMB a da , reflecting that the 
benefits of additional abatement diminish, and that ( ) / 0dMAC a da , demonstrating that 
marginal abatement costs increase with increased abatement efforts.  The resulting optimal level 
of abatement is * 3/ 4a .  Thus, the optimal amount of C02 abated is seventy-five percent. This 
result is depicted in Figure 1 below. This figure is standard, indicating the optimal level of 
abatement at 3/4 with a marginal cost of abatement of $1.125 thousand. 
 
Figure 1. 
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Modeling the Economic “Bad”   
To set this problem up, recognize that emissions, are those pollutant releases that are not 
abated, or 1a e , where [0,1]e  is the percentage of carbon emitted (i.e. the percent not 
abated).  Secondly, environmental damages are understood as the opposite of abatement benefits. 
Define the damages function as ( ) ( )D e B a .  Finally, the abatement cost function with 
emissions as the argument is '( ) ( )A e A a .   
Unlike the economic “good” case, the goal here is to minimize Social Costs (SC); i.e. the 
costs (damages plus abatement costs) associated with emissions: 
 
 min ( ) '( )
e
SC ND e A e . (4) 
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Again, introducing our specific functions yields: 
 
 2 2min 12(1 0.5(1 ) ) 2(1 )
e
SC e e e . (5) 
 
The first order condition here is where the marginal damages from emissions (MD(e)) equals the 
marginal cost of abating emissions (MAC’(e)). Mathematically, from (5), this condition is: 
 
 12 4(1 ),e e  (6) 
 
where MD(e) = 12e and MAC’(e) = 4(1-e).  The resulting optimal level of emissions is 
* 1/ 4e .  Just to highlight the duality, note that a* = 1- e* = 3/4.  Figure 2, common in most 
textbooks, illustrates this equilibrium and essentially represents a mirror image of Figure 1. 
Consistent with expectation, the model demonstrates that ( ) / 0dMD e de , illustrating that 
marginal damages increase with increased pollution.  Also with this model, '( ) / 0dMAC e de , 
indicating that marginal abatement costs fall as emissions increase. This reflects the notion that 
less effort is being directed towards abatement. While this result makes intuitive sense, it is 
plausible, indeed likely, that students may have some initial difficulty due to the “unusual” 
feature that the marginal abatement cost function is downward-sloping.
4
  Once students are 
exposed to the duality via an example like the one presented here, the situation becomes clear. 
 
Figure 2. 
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Welfare Analysis 
To solidify the duality, it is valuable to include the exercise of comparing the welfare 
implications of both approaches.  This is done below. 
 
Welfare Analysis and the Economic “Good” 
Typically, welfare analysis embodies both a calculation of the net social benefits to 
pollution control and/or a calculation of the total costs associated with pollution control. For 
optimal net social benefits of pollution control when modeling the economic “good” (SW(a*)), 
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we see from Figure 1 that this is quantifiably equivalent to the areas W+X.  This is 
mathematically represented as: 
 
 
3/ 4
0
( *) 12(1 ) 4SW a a a da , (7) 
 
which when evaluated is: 
 
 
3/ 4
2 2 2 2
0
( *) 12( 0.5 ) 2 12(3/ 4 0.5(3/ 4) ) 2(3/ 4) $4.5SW a a a a . (8) 
 
With respect to optimal social cost (SC(a*)), from Figure 1 we see that this is quantifiably 
equivalent to areas Y+Z, or: 
 
 ( *) 0.5(3/ 4)1.125 0.5(2 / 4)1.125 0.5(1.125) $0.5625SC a . (9) 
 
Welfare Analysis and the Economic “Bad”   
For the economic “bad” optimal net social benefits of pollution control (SW(e*)), we 
read Figure 2 from the right-hand-side axis.  Here, the benefits are the avoided damages (area 
W’+ X’+ Y’) minus cost of abatement (Y’).  This is represented mathematically as: 
 
 
1
1/ 4
( *) 12 4(1 )SW e e e de , (10) 
 
which when evaluated is: 
 
 
1
2 2 2 2
1/ 4
( *) 6 2(1 ) 6 6(1/ 4) 2(3/ 4) $4.5SW e e e . (11) 
 
From Figure 2, we see that optimal social cost (SC(e*)) is quantifiably equivalent to areas Y’+ 
Z’, or: 
 
 ( *) 0.5(1/ 4)1.125 0.5(3/ 4)1.125 0.5(1.125) $0.5625SC a . (12) 
 
Again, the duality is apparent.  To highlight this condition graphically, it is beneficial to point 
out that W+X from Figure 1 equals W’+ X’ from Figure 2.  Likewise, Y+Z from Figure 1 is 
equivalent to Y’+ Z’ from Figure 2. 
 
Conclusion 
Textbook treatment of optimal emissions (abatement) varies markedly from textbook to 
textbook. In particular, there is no consensus as to whether to model the economic “bad” (i.e. 
emissions) or the economic “good” (abatement).  This inconsistency can lead to needless 
confusion for students introduced to environmental economics for the first time, particularly 
those outside of the formal economics major, such as students of business administration, law 
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and public policy.  To mitigate this confusion, I propose a simple example that instructors can 
use to quickly illustrate the duality between modeling the emissions and modeling the abatement. 
As models in environmental economics become more and more complex, and as these 
models filter into textbooks, consistency of presentation becomes increasingly difficult. It may 
be desirable from a learning perspective to model emissions when presenting, say, a cap-and-
trade model and to model abatement when modeling, say, a deposit-refund system.  Indeed, no 
textbook author should feel compelled to force consistency in model presentation at the expense 
of pedagogical clarity. Diversity in presentation may ultimately be a good thing, but avoiding 
unnecessary student confusion is desirable as well.  A unifying example that encapsulates the 
duality associated with modeling the economic “good” and the economic “bad” can allow 
students to focus less on notational inconsistency and more on conceptual understanding. 
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